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Good and the Object of Natural
Inclinations in St. Thomas Aquinas1
JOHN L JENKINS
What is the relationship between what we, in our most
reflective and circumspect moments, desire or approve of and what
is our good? In this essay I will explore the views of St. Thomas
Aquinas on this issue. I will develop my interpretation of Aquinas
dialectically by considering and criticizing aspects of the influential
interpretations of Germain Grisez2 and John Finnish on one hand,
and Ralph Mclnerny,^ on the other.5 These interpre tat ions, I will
1. Anthony Kenny, Brian Davies, O.P., Robert George, Ralph Mclnerny, and
David Burrell, C.S.C., were all most generous in reading and commenting upon
various versions of this paper, and I am most grateful for their help. Of course, the
opinions expressed herein are to be ascribed to me alone. This paper was substantially
completed in January, 1991 and I have been unable to take notice of studies published
since then.
2. Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on
the Summa theologiae 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965):
168-201.
3. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1980).
4 Mclnerny's criticisms of Grisez and Finnis are found in Ethica Thomistica
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982). Grisez and Finnis
responded to Mclnerny in "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph
Mclnerny," American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981): 21-31.
5. Grisez and Finnis's writing has set off a long and vigorous debate. Other
recent contributions include the following. Robert George gives an admirably clear
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argue, founder because of improper analyses and common misunder-
standings of key terms in Aquinas. Once we have a proper grasp of
Aquinas's position, we can better appreciate it as the interesting and
subtle ethical theory that it is.
Although the Grisez-Finnis interpretation differs from Mclnerny's
on several points, two issues are central. Both of these issues have to
do with the putative distinction between facts about our natural in-
clinations and our good, and one difficulty in adjudicating this debate
is that the disputants fail to distinguish clearly between these distinct
issues. The first concerns the question of whether Thomas thought
that a subject could infer judgments about what is normatively good
for herself and about what she ought (normatively) to do from some
set of descriptive or factual judgments about her nature, capacities,
and inclinations. We can call this the epistemological question or
issue: it concerns whether Thomas thought that intellectual assent to
certain propositions of one sort tends to make epistemically rational
assent to certain propositions of another sort. This epistemological
question is distinguishable from, though not entirely independent
of, what we can call the conceptual question or issue about the
nature of the normatively good for Thomas. This concerns whether
Thomas thought that being the object of human inclinations is (at
least partly) constitutive of the concept of good, or (to put it in
more Thomistic language) of the ratio boni. We will discuss these
questions consecutively. I will argue that though Mclnerny is nearer
the truth on the first question, Grisez and Finnis are nearer the truth
on the second.
summary and a brief defense of the Grisez-Finnis interpretation in "Recent Criticism
of Natural Law Theory" (Book Review), University of Chicago Law Review 55 (1988):
1378-85. Douglas Flippen challenged the Grisez-Finnis view in "Natural Law and
Natural Inclinations," New Scholasticism 60 (1986): 284-316, and Grisez responded
with a defense of his interpretation in "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Some
Comments and Clarifications," New Scholasticism 61 (1987): 307-320. Janice Schultz
took up the issues in several articles including: "Is-Ought: Prescribing and a Present
Controversy," Thomist 49 (1985): 1-23; " Όught'-Judgments: A Descriptivist Analysis
from a Thomistic Perspective," New Scholasticism 61 (1987): 400-426; "Thomistic
Metaethics and a Present Controversy," Thomist 52 (1988): 40-62; and "St. Thomas
Aquinas on Necessary Moral Principles," New Scholasticism 62 (1988): 150-178. Peter
Simpson has also contributed in "St. Thomas on the Naturalistic Fallacy," Thomist 51
(1987): 51-69; and in "Practical Knowing: Some Comments on Finnis and Aquinas,"
Modern Schoolman 67 (1990): 111-122.
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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTION
The principles of practical reason, which Aquinas also
calls the precepts of natural law, specify goods to be pursued by
actions. These Grisez and Finnis call the basic goods. Did Aquinas
think that certain principles of practical reason could be inferred from
certain factual judgments about human nature and natural inclina^
tions? Grisez and Finnis are brisk and emphatic in their insistence
that Aquinas did not think such an inference could be made.6 Is
this correct?
Let us consider first Summa theologiae 1-2.94.2. This passage is the
only one which Grisez treats extensively, and from which he develops
his interpretation. Since it is, as it were, Grisez's chosen field of battle,
we should expect to find strong support for his view here. But I believe
Mclnerny provides a more natural reading of the article.
In the corpus of this article, after saying that practical reason
is analogous to theoretical reason, and that the first principle of
theoretical reason, the principle of non-contradiction, is based on
its first ratio, the ratio of being, Thomas writes:
And thus the first principle in practical reasoning is the one based upon
the ratio of the good, which is: good is 'that to which all things are
naturally inclined'. Therefore this is the first precept of the law, that
good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.7
In this passage, then, Thomas tells us that the formula which expresses
a subject's intellectual grasp of the ratio of good is 'that to which all
things are naturally inclined'. Since this seems to suggest that the
understanding of the good is as the object of natural inclination, it
appears that precepts stating basic goods for humans can be inferred
from judgments about our natural inclinations. Thus this passage
appears, at least prima fade, to undermine Grisez's interpretation.
Grisez, of course, offers an alternative reading of this passage. He
distinguishes two senses of 'good'. There is, he concedes, a descriptive
sense of 'good' according to which the good is simply the end of some
6. Grisez, "First Principle," p. 195; Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 33.
7. Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae 1.94.2. As with all the citations from
Aquinas in this paper, the translation is mine. The edition of the Summa used is
the collation of the Piana and Leonine editions (Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1953—).
In this passage, the quotation marks and italics are mine.
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natural tendency. As he writes, "for each active principle the end on
account of which it acts is a good for it. . . ."8 Hence, we can say that
blooming in spring is good for roses, and they ought to do so.9 But,
he insists, "to get moral principles from metaphysics, it is not from
the 'is' of nature to the 'ought* of nature that one must go." 10 The
good and ought relevant to practical reason and natural law are the
normative senses; in this sense 'good' is not meant as the object of a
natural tendency. Grisez, then, sharply distinguishes the normatively
good from the descriptively good.
About the passage in question, Grisez writes:
This formula [i.e., 'bonum est quod omnia appetunt'] is a classic expression
of what the word 'good' means. Of course, we often mean more than this
by 'good', but any other meaning at least includes this notion.11
It is not clear, however, just what Grisez thinks the grasp of the ratio of
good is. He may be suggesting that the sense of 'good' under discussion
in Summa theologiae 1-2.94.2 is some generic notion which includes
both the descriptive and normative notions as species. Alternatively,
Grisez might be suggesting that the notion is initially simply the
vague notion of someone who has as yet failed to distinguish the
descriptive and normative notions. If he is suggesting the former, he
must give us some reason to believe that Aquinas recognizes such
a generic notion—but he does not do this. If he is suggesting the
latter, he must explain how a correct apprehension of the principles
of practical reason can be based upon a vague understanding of the
intelligibility of the good—but neither does he do this.
It is difficult to extract from Grisez any clear interpretation of this
passage in Summa theologiae 1-2.94.2 about the ratio of good. His
failure to produce a clear interpretation of this passage is not, I believe,
due simply to careless writing. It is due, rather, to an incompatibility
between key tenets of Grisez's reading of Aquinas and what Aquinas
actually says about our understanding of the good.
In the corpus of Summa theologiae 1-2.94.2 Aquinas is concerned
with a certain order among what is apprehended by the intellect. ("Of
8. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.94.2.
9. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.94.2.
10. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.94.2.
11. Grisez, "First Principle," p. 178.
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the things which enter into our apprehension of anything, a certain
order is found.") Regarding the principles of practical reason, that
which falls first in this order is the grasp of the ratio of good as 'that
to which all things are naturally inclined', which grasp we have been
discussing. Based upon this grasp is the first principle of practical
reason, 'Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided*. ("The
first principle in practical reasoning is based on the ratio of good.")
Thirdly, the subordinate principles of practical reason are based upon
the first principle. ("On this [first precept of the law] is based all other
precepts of the natural law.")
It is not entirely clear just what Aquinas has in mind when he
speaks of "a certain order" which is found among "the things which
enter into our apprehension." The order may be that by which people
ordinarily become aware of the principles. Alternatively, it may be an
order of explanation; that is, though what is prior may not be known
before what is posterior in the order, nevertheless we explain what
is posterior by reference to what is prior.12 But, however this order
is to be understood, it does seem clear that whatever sense good has
in the first principle and subordinate principles, it is that which is
apprehended in the initial grasp of the ratio of good. If this were not
so, it is hard to see how the subordinate principles could be "based
upon" the grasp of the ratio of good.
According to Grisez, however, the sense of 'good' in the subor-
dinate principles of practical reason is of the normatively good. In
this sense, Grisez emphasizes, 'good' is not understood as what is the
object of some natural inclination, for that is the understanding of
the descriptively good. But then it seems clear that the sense 'good'
has in these subordinate principles is not "that to which all things
are naturally inclined." Therefore it seems that Grisez is forced to
accept some change in the sense of 'good' between the initial grasp
of the ratio of good and the formulation of the subordinate principles
of practical reason.
Mclnerny, on the other hand, does not recognize a distinction
between the descriptively good and the normatively good. He holds
that the ratio of good is the ratio under which we desire all we desire.
For Mclnerny, then, the grasp of the ratio of good can be a grasp of
12. An argument in subsequent pages implies that it is best understood as an
order of explanation.
THE GOOD AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 67
ithat to which all things are naturally inclined', if this is taken as
the ratio of their inclination. This understanding would be what is
presupposed by practical reason. And it would lead us, as Mclnerny
suggests, to a consideration of our natural inclinations and of what
is perfective of human nature. This consideration would then lead us
to the fundamental precepts of the natural law. And this reasoning
seems to accord with that outlined in the corpus of Summa theologiae
1-2.94.2.
I have argued, then, that Grisez must read into Summa theologiae
1-2.94.2c a shift in the sense of 'good' which Aquinas does not
acknowledge, and that consequently Grisez's reading of the passage is
more forced and unnatural than Mclnerny's alternative, and perhaps
other alternatives as well. But although this conclusion may weaken
Grisez's position, it does not wholly undermine it: Grisez can argue
that his interpretation is unavoidable in light of other considerations,
and thus, all things considered, it is superior to the alternatives. So
we are led to ask what other support Grisez and Finnis offer for their
reading. And the answer to this is clear: it is that Thomas says that
the principles of practical reason are immediate, indemonstrable and
per se nota. As Grisez writes, these principles "are not derived from
statements of fact. They are principles. They are not derived from any
statements at all. . . . They are underίvable."13 This also seems to be
Finnis's primary argument: "Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that
the first principles of the basic forms of good and evil, which specify
the basic form of good and evil and which can be adequately grasped
by anyone of the age of reason. . . are per se nota (self-evident) and
indemonstrable."14 Let us say that a proposition, p, is epistemically
basic for a subject, S, if S believes p, but S does not believe p on the
basis of any other proposition S believes. Grisez and Finnis's point
here is that if certain propositions are said to be principles which
are per se nota and indemonstrable, then, in the normal case at least,
they are epistemically basic for a normal subject. This seems to be
Grisez and Finnis's primary argument in support of their position on
the epistemological question.
13. Grisez, "First Principle," p. 195. In a more recent defense of his position,
Grisez repeats and reaffirms this argument. See Grisez, "Natural Law and Natural
Inclinations."
14. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 33.
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I will try to show that this argument of Grisez and Finnis is based
upon a common misunderstanding of Thomas's view of a science
and scientific demonstration. 1 5 Aquinas's most extensive discussion
of the nature of scientific demonstration is found in his comment
tary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. When we turn to Aquinas's
Aristotelian commentaries, however, we run into the thorny and
controversial question of whether and to what extent we can attribute
to Aquinas the views he attributes to Aristotle. 1 6 My own view is close
to Chenu's, who says that a medieval commentator such as Aquinas
is presumed to take the contents of the text as his own unless he says
otherwise.1 7 In what follows, however, although I will quote Aquinas's
Aristotelian commentaries as indicating his own view, I will add, in
footnotes or in the text, a place where Aquinas asserts or implies the
doctrine in question in his own work.
The propositions which are principles of a science are, as Thomas
frequently notes, "immediata, indemonstrabiles et per se nota." As
he writes, "any proposition whose predicate is contained in the ratio
of the subject is immediate ['immediata'] and self-evident ['per se
nota']. . . ."1 8 He seems to have several interrelated points in mind
here. A proposition of the form Ά is B' is immediate if there is no
further middle term, B*, which one can employ in a demonstrative
syllogism to demonstrate the inherence of B in A. That is, Ά is
15. Even a persistent critic of many features of the Grisez-Finnis position, Janice
Schultz, accepts this point that per se nota propositions are epistemically basic for
the normal subject, though it presents rather serious problems for her. See Schultz,
"Necessary Moral Principles."
16. See Jean Isaac, "Saint Thomas interprete des oeuvres d'Aristote," in Scholastica
Ratione Historico-Cήtica Instauranda: Acta Congressus Scholastici Intemationalis Ro*
mae anno sancto 1950 celebrati (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1951),
pp. 355-363; Marie-Dominique Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans.
A.'M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964); Joseph Owens,
"Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Com"
memoraύve Studies, ed. Armand A. Maurer (Toronto: PIMS, 1974) 1:213-238; Mark
Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas's Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries," in Phi-
losophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.P., ed.
R. James Long (Toronto: PIMS, 1991), pp. 99-112.
17. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, pp. 207-208.
18. Thomas Aquinas Expositio libri Posteriorum 1.5, Leonine Opera omnia l*/2
(Rome: Commissio Leonina and Paris: J. Vrin, 1989), p. 25, lines 116-118. Compare
Summa theol. 1.2.1.
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B' is immediate if there is no proper demonstrative syllogism of
the form:
AisB*
B* isB
AisB
And since there is no further middle term B*, there is no demon-
strative syllogism which proves that A is B, and this proposition is
indemonstrable. Finally, since there is no more ultimate middle term,
it is thought that the predicate B is "contained in" the ratio of A,
and so the proposition Ά is B' can be known by anyone who fully
understands the rationes involved. That is, it can be known per se,
or, as Grisez and Finnis say, it is self-evident. The three terms—
immediate, indemonstrable, and self-evident—are, it is important to
note, co-extensive terms for Aquinas.
Grisez and Finnis realize that not all immediate, self-evident propo-
sitions are self-evident to us. Although it is true that for any such
proposition a full grasp of the ratio of the subject is sufficient for seeing
that the predicate is contained in it and thus that the proposition is
true, such a grasp of the ratio of the subject may be beyond us. This
may be so even when we in some sense understand the proposition,
yet fall short of a complete understanding which enables us to see that
the proposition is true. In such cases, the proposition is self-evident
in se or secundum naturam, but not quoad nos. The most extreme cases
of such a disparity between what is self-evident in itself and to us
are found in theology. That God exists is self-evident in itself, but
not to us:
This proposition, 'God exists', is self-evident in itself, because the pred-
icate and subject are identical; for God is his own existence. . . . But
because we do not possess scientific knowledge of God with respect
to what he is, he is not self-evident to us. Rather, [the proposition
'God exists'] needs to be demonstrated through things which are better
known to us, and less known according to nature, namely, through God's
effects.19
So Thomas distinguishes between what is self-evident "in itself
("in se") and "with respect to us" {"quoad nos"), and these are by
19. Thomas Aquinas Summa theoi 1.2.1.
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no means co-extensive; though all of what is self-evident to us is
self-evident in itself, some of what is self-evident in itself is not
evident to us. The proposition 'God exists' is an example of an
immediate, indemonstrable, self-evident principle which is not evi-
dent to us. As the passage just quoted indicates, such a proposition,
though it is indemonstrable, nevertheless admits of demonstration by
us. The resolution of this paradoxical claim is found, of course, in
distinguishing two sorts of demonstration. A self-evident principle
does not admit of demonstration propter quid, which, as we see below,
is required from scientific demonstration. It does admit of, and can
come to be known by, demonstration quia, which is demonstration
from effect to cause. Thomas writes:
There are two kinds of demonstration. One is through the cause [to
the effect], and it is called a propter quid demonstration: and this is [a
demonstration] which moves from things which are prior simpliciter. The
other is through the effect [to the cause], and it is called a demon-
stration quia: and this is [a demonstration] which moves from those
things which are prior with respect to us; for when an effect is more
manifest to us than its cause, we move from the effect to knowledge
of the cause. . . . Hence, due to the fact that God's existence is not
something self-evident with respect to us, it is demonstrable from effects
better known to us.20
The propositions which concern us are not theological, but the prin-
ciples of practical reason. Finnis says that Aquinas is "regrettably
obscure" on, among other things, the question of to whom the prin-
ciples are self-evident.21 Yet, as we have seen above, from Thomas's
claim that the principles of practical reason are self-evident and in-
demonstrable, Grisez and Finnis want to infer that he thinks they are
epistemically basic for the ordinary subject who is capable of rational
moral judgments. Therefore, they must suppose that, unless there is
some more or less clear indication to the contrary, then in the non-
theological sciences self-evident means self-evident quoad nos as well
as in se. This supposition would be very plausible if Thomas thought
the demonstrative structure of these sciences was epistemological.
Tha t is, the claim would be plausible if Thomas thought that the
order of demonstration in the various sciences reflected the order in
20. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.2.2.
21. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 51.
THE GOOD AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 71
which o n e 2 2 comes to know the various propositions of the science.
This may seem a very plausible way to think of the demonstrative
structure of a science. I want to argue, however, that this is clearly
not the way Aquinas thought of the demonstrative structure of a
science, and thus that Grisez and Finnish supposition that self-evident
principles can generally be supposed to be self-evident quoad nos is
quite unfounded.
One possesses demonstrative knowledge when one knows a propo-
sition as the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism.23 A demonstra-
tive syllogism is not just any valid, sound syllogism, but one which
Aristotle characterizes as follows:
. . . it is necessary for demonstrative understanding in particular to depend
on things which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar
than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion (for in ths way the
principles will also be causal to what is being proved).24
According to Aristotle, then, a key requirement of a demonstrative
syllogism is that the premises refer to the cause and the conclusion
refers to the effect. Aquinas in his own work says that "scientia" can
be gained by a demonstration quia, one which moves from effects
to cause.2 5 However, it seems clear that this is scientific knowledge
in a secondary or deficient sense, for such an apprehension does not
proceed from principles which are per se nota or known by a higher
science.2 6 For science simpliciter, demonstrations must be propter quid;
they must proceed from causes which are prior simplicίter^ This
22. The knower in question may either be the one who first discovered truths of
the science, the student who learns them, or both the discoverer and the student.
23. "Scientific knowledge (scire) seems to be nothing other than 'to understand'
the truth of some conclusion 'through demonstration'" (Thomas Aquinas Expos.
Post. 1.4 [Leonine l*/2:20.142-144]). Compare, "Scientia causes the intellect to assent
through vision and understanding of first principles" {Summa theol. 1.12.13.ad 3).
24. Aristotle Posterior Analytics 1.2 (71b20-23), trans. Jonathan Barnes, in The
Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)
1:115, with modifications.
25. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 2-2.1.5.
26. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.1.2. Aquinas follows Aristotle in distinguish-
ing between scientific knowledge in its full sense or simpliciter and various deficient
or secundum quid forms of it. See Aristotle Posterior Analytics 2 and Thomas Aquinas
Sent. Post. Anal. 1.4.
27. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.2.2.
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requirement tha t scientific demonstra t ions are demonstra t ions propter
quid implies tha t the demonstra t ive structure of a science is no t
epistemological, but reflects the real causal order. Aquinas realized,
for example, tha t the posit ion of the m o o n caused h igh and low tide,
and thus, on this view of demonstra t ive science, the fact tha t the
tide is h igh must be demonst ra ted from the fact tha t t he m o o n is in
a cer ta in posit ion. But, clearly, we do no t come to know tha t it is
h igh tide by inferring it from our beliefs about the moon 's position;
knowledge of the moon 's causal influence was n o doubt subsequent
to the awareness of h igh t ide.
This issue is somewhat complicated, however, by the fact tha t
Aris tot le and Aquinas held tha t epistemological considerations were
relevant to a demonstra t ive syllogism, albeit no t in tha t the former
determined the structure of the latter. In the passage just quoted,
Aris tot le says tha t premises must be "better known" t h a n conclusions,
and the poin t of this s t ipulat ion becomes clear later in the text . For
a perfect demonstra t ive syllogism, it seems tha t no t only must the
demonst ra t ion be from cause to effect, but our knowledge of the cause
must itself be the cause of our knowledge of the effect.28 T h a t is,
a l though we initially come to know causes th rough effects, the goal
of scientific inquiry is, as it were, ' to restructure ' our beliefs so tha t
we come to know effects through causes.
However this ' restructuring' is to go, it seems clear tha t the s t ip '
ulat ion tha t the principles, which describe the causes, are k n o w n
bet ter t h a n and prior to conclusions, which describe effects, expresses
an ideal and no t the no rm for initial discovery in a science. G o d
knows effects through causes,2 9 but for the weaker intellects of h u m a n
beings, in a very large number of cases, our knowledge of conclusions
of a science is prior to, bet ter k n o w n than , and the cause of our
knowledge of its principles. T h u s the principles of a science are always
intrinsically self-evident, but no t to us:
And because prior and better known are said in two ways (viz., with
respect to us and according to nature) the Philosopher consequently says
28. Aristotle Posterior Analytics 1.2 (72a25-33). Compare Thomas Aquinas Summa
theol. 1.12.13 ad 3 and 1-2.51.2.
29. "God [sees] his effects in himself, which is [to see them] in their cause. . . ."
(Summa theol. 1.14.7).
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that those things from which demonstration moves are prior and better
known simpliciter and according to nature, and not to us.30
Consequently, Aquinas writes, in the normal course of much of sci-
entific inquiry, the immediate and intrinsically self-evident principles
are demonstrated from non-immediate, intrinsically less evident con-
clusions of the science:
In the acquisition of scientific knowledge principles and elements are not
always prior, for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at knowledge
of principles and intelligible causes.31
Such a demonstration is, of course, a demonstration quid. Thomas,
following Aristotle, continues to hold that, though the principles may
initially be known through effects, one strives for the ideal of knowing
effects through causes, and achieving this ideal often requires a certain
restructuring, as it were, of one's system of beliefs.32 But in whatever
way this restructuring is to be achieved, it seems clear that the way
in which principles are known according to this ideal is certainly not
the way they are first known by a subject.
If the preceding is correct, then we cannot straightforwardly infer
from the fact that Aquinas says that certain principles are immediate
and self-evident that they are self-evident quoad nos, and thus epis-
30. Thomas Aquinas Expos. Post. 1.4 (Leonine l*/2:21.245-9). Compare, Summa
theol. 1.2.2.
31. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.85.8 ad 1. See also my "Aquinas on the Verac-
ity of the Intellect," Journal of Philosophy 88/11 (1991): 623-632, especially pp. 629-
632. I discuss Aquinas's account of how our apprehension of natural essences arises
initially from a grasp of merely accidental properties apparent to sense perception.
32. In several passages Aristotle and Aquinas wrestle with the question of how this
restructuring might be carried out. As Aquinas writes, "in the completion of scientific
knowledge, the scientific knowledge of the effect always depends on knowledge of
principles and elements since, as the Philosopher says..., we do not think we know
something scientifically until we can make principles manifest in light of their causes"
(Summa theol. 1.85.8 ad 1). This is perhaps plausible when we can come to have more
immediate knowledge of a cause we initially knew by inference from effects. Neil
Armstrong would have achieved such knowledge if an eclipse had occurred while he
was standing on the moon. Barring lunar travel, it is difficult to see how this cause
could ever be better known if someone were, as Thomas and Aristotle certainly
were, restricted to hypothetical inference from effects observable from earth. This
is precisely the problem Aristotle struggles with in Posterior Analytics 1.13, but with
dubious results.
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temically basic in the normal case for a normal subject. In the case
of very obvious and fundamental tautologies, such as the principle of
non-contradiction, he certainly does think these are self-evident to
all. But in the case of at least many and perhaps most principles of
sciences, we must move from what is most knowable to us to what is
most knowable in itself, and so the immediate principles are initially
known inferentially. But if this is so, the central argument of Grisez
and Finnis regarding the epistemological question collapses. In the
absence of some further evidence from the texts of Thomas, we cannot
suppose that the principles of practical reason—or any other science
for that matter—are, at least initially, epistemically basic for a subject.
There seems to be another consideration which, less overtly but
perhaps just as powerfully, motivates Grisez and Finnis's view. In a
reply to Mclnerny they discuss the move from descriptive to norma-
tive claims. Generally when Grisez and Finnis discuss this, they ask
whether there is a "licit inference,"33 or about whether ought can be
derived from is.3^ Here they say, "Our point . . . was that there can be
no valid deduction of a normative conclusion without a normative
principle, and thus the first practical principle cannot be derived
from metaphysical speculation."35 They move without explanation
from a question of rational inference to a question of deduction. The
question of the inference or derivation of certain propositions from
others is a question about epistemically rational inference, one form
of which is logical deduction. But Grisez and Finnis's unexplained
shift from speaking of inference generally to deduction suggests that
they see the former is restricted to the latter in this case. If this
is granted, then Grisez and Finnis are perhaps right that normative
conclusions cannot be derived from descriptive premises, but why
should we suppose that Aquinas would recognize such a restriction?
It makes sense within the tight strictures of a Humean epistemology,
and thus it is no surprise that Hume was the one to announce that Us'
cannot be derived from 'ought'. But there is no reason to suppose that
Aquinas's epistemology was Humean. And thus there is no reason to
suppose that the derivation of normative from descriptive claims must
be restricted to logical deduction.
33. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 33-36.
34. Grisez, "First Principle," p. 194.
35. Grisez and Finnis, "Basic Principles," p. 24.
THE GOOD AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 75
I conclude that Aquinas did think that normative judgments, and
indeed some principles of practical reason, can be inferred from certain
judgments about human nature and human inclinations. This inter-
pretation gives us a more natural reading of Thomas's discussions on
the principles of practical reason, and Grisez and Finnis's arguments
against such a reading are not compelling.
THE CONCEPTUAL QUESTION
In addition to the epistemological question, there is a
conceptual question about the good. Is being desirable, being the
object of natural inclinations, constitutive of the concept of good
for Aquinas? Mclnerny seems to answer this question affirmatively,
while Grisez and Finnis respond negatively. Although I sided with
Mclnerny on the epistemological question, I think Grisez and Finnis
are nearer the truth on this question.
The question to be addressed must be formulated more precisely.
First of all, the above formulation asks whether being desirable is
constitutive of being good, but desirable' is ambiguous. Let us intπ>
duce some distinctions and corresponding labels. Let us call something
'factually desirable' if it is such that it is either what an agent thinks
will satisfy his desires, or what will in fact do so. We can divide this
genus into two species. Of the factually desirable objects or states of
affairs, let us call those 'merely factually desirable' which an agent
thinks will satisfy his desires, though they would not, if attained, in
fact do so. And let us call those 'genuinely factually desirable' which
are such that, if attained, would in fact satisfy the agent's desires,
whether or not the agent realizes this.
For both sorts of the factually desirable, desirability is a relational
attribute; it is an attribute something has insofar as it bears a re^
lationship to an agent with certain desires and beliefs, or, at least,
certain dispositions to desire and believe. These two are the only
senses of 'desirable' which Mclnerny considers or would accept.36
It will be helpful, though, to introduce another sense of 'desirable'
36. In Mclnerny's terminology, the factually desirable is called the desirάblei, and
the genuinely factually desirable is called the desirable2
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to accord with Grisez and Finnis's understanding of Thomas's basic
goods. According to them, these goods are goods for humans because
human beings, given their natural inclinations, have a certain affinity
to them; but their goodness does not consist in the fact that hu-
mans have such an affinity. It is rather a feature some things have
independently of whether humans in fact desire them. Such goods
are, according to Grisez and Finnis, worthy of desire intrinsically,
whether or not they are factually desirable, and whether merely or
genuinely so. Let us say that an object which is worthy of desire in
this non-relational sense is intrinsically desirable. Mclnerny's view
seems to be that being genuinely factually desirable is constitutive of
the concept of good, while Grisez and Finnis seem to think that only
being intrinsically desirable is.
A second needed refinement of our question regards the terms 'con-
stitutive' and 'concept1. Although these terms are taken for granted
by recent philosophers, it is not obvious how they are to be translated
into Aquinas's terminology. For Aquinas, the essence or quiddity
of a thing is what makes a thing the sort of thing it is.3? In the
primary senses of the terms, only substances have an essence or
quiddity, and the essence is primarily the substantial form.38 The
essence is the principle of intelligibility of the thing, and as intel-
ligible structure (which is the substantial form abstracted from the
individuating conditions of matter) it is called the intelligible species
or ration9 This ratio is expressed by a definition.40 In his commentary
on Aristotle's Metaphysics Aquinas says that although only substances
have an essence or quiddity and a definition in the primary senses of
these terms, in a secondary and analogous sense things which are not
in the category of substance, such as good, have an essence or quiddity
and definition.^* In what follows, then, I will speak of the essence or
37. See, for example, De Ente et Essentia 1 and Sent. lib. Metaphysicorum 7.3, ed.
R. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1950), no. 1303.
38. Thomas Aquinas Sent Metaph. 7.3 (Spiazzi nos. 1324, 1327).
39. Thomas Aquinas Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate 5.2; Summa theol.
1.85.1, corpus ad 1, ad 2.
40. Thomas Aquinas Expositio libri Peryermenias 1.2 in the Leonine Opera omnia
1*/1 (Rome: Commissio Leonina and Paris: J. Vrin, 1989), pp. 10-11, lines 89-112;
Sent. Metaph. 7.7 (Spiazzi no. 613).
41. Thomas Aquinas Sent. Metaph. 7.4 (Spiazzi nos. 1331, 1335, 1337, 1355).
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quiddity of good and its ratio and definition in this secondary and
analogous sense of these terms.
We can now reformulate our question as follows: Is being an object
of natural inclination, in the sense of being genuinely factually desk'
able, part of the quiddity, or essence, or ratio of good for Aquinas? Let
us label one who answers this question affirmatively an essentialist. As
said above, though I believe Mclnerny seems to hold an essentialist
position, his view is not elaborated. One who does explicitly embrace
a version of essentiaiism and elaborates it is Ronald Duska.42
Duska emphasizes De veritate 21, articles 1 and 2 in his interpret
tation of Aquinas. He claims that there we find "a definition of
the good as well as explanations of this definition."43 That is, he
explains, in this question Aquinas gives us "necessary conditions for
calling something good."4 4 Duska quotes two passages in this regard.
(He actually quotes Aquinas in an English translation which I find
problematic and which does not accord with the terminology I have
adopted in this paper. Thus I provide my own translation along with
Aquinas's Latin.) These are:
It is to be said that, since the ratio of good consists in this, that something
is perfective of another as an end, whatever is found to have the ratio of an
end also has the ratio of good. Two things are of the ratio of an end: (1) it
is naturally inclined to or desired by those who have not yet attained
the end, or (2) it is enjoyed, and, as it were, enjoyable, by those who
participate in the end.
Dicendum quod cum boni ratio in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectum
alterius per modum finis, omne illud quod invenitur habere rationem finis
42. Ronald Duska, "Aquinas's Definition of Good: Ethical-Theoretical Notes
on De veήtate, Q. 21," Monist 58 (1974): 151-162. Ironically, John Finnis refers
us to Duska's article for clarification about "the relation between the desired, the
desirable, and the perfective in Aquinas's notion of good" (Natural Law and Natural
Rights, p. 79). Others, as well as myself, find this confusing (see also Janice Schultz,
"Thomistic Metaethics and a Present Controversy"). For Duska's reading would not
support but undermine Finnis's claim that "for one who considers knowledge to be
a good, the true expression of his opinion and attitude is not 'it is good because or
in so far as I desire it', but Ί desire it because and in so far as it is good'" (Natural
Law and Natural Rights, p. 70).
43. Duska, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 152.
44. Duska, Natural Law and Natural Rig/its, p. 152.
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habet et rationem boni. Duo autem sunt de ratione ήnis: ut sit scilicet
appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem nondum attingunt, et ut sit
delectum et quasi delectible ab his quae finem participant. . . 4 5
Primarily and principally, therefore, a being is called good which is per*
fective of another as an end.
Sic ergo primo et principaliter dicitur bonum ens perfectivum alterius per
modum finis.46
Duska discusses what h e sees as "two elements in this definit ion. . .
(1) the n o t i o n of good as something perfective of another and (2) t h e
n o t i o n of good as an e n d . " 4 7 H e comments o n the second "element,"
saying:
According to the text there are two simple criteria for determining
whether something is an end: (1) "It must be sought [appetitum] or desired
by things which have not yet attained the end," and (2) "it must be loved
[dΐίectum] by the things which share the end, and be, as it were, enjoyable
[delectible] to them. 4 8
We find in Duska's Aquinas what I will call a dual component
view of the essence or ratio of good. The essence or ratio of good
for something of a certain kind consists of both the notion of being
perfective for that sort of thing and the notion of being an end,
which is just to be desired or enjoyed by individuals of that kind.
As he points out, this second component requires actual desiring
and, if attained, actual enjoyment.4 9 Duska's position, then, is an
essentialist one which sees being the object of natural inclinations
of certain creatures, being genuinely factually desirable for them,
as one component of the essence or ratio of good for creatures of
that kind; being perfective for creatures of that kind is the other
45. Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones disputatae de veήtate 21.2, in Leonine Opera
omnia 22 (Rome: Editio di San Tomasso, 1975), p. 596, lines 61-69.
46. Thomas Aquinas De verit. 21.1 (Leonine 22: 594.207-209).
47. Duska, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 153.
48. Duska, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 153.
49. As Duska writes, "this criterion for an end of being desired, demands actual
desiring" (Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 153-154, n. 10).
THE GOOD AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 79
component.50 There are some immediate and obvious problems with
what Duska says. Firstly, it seems unwise to base an interpretation of
Aquinas on the Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, one of his earliest
works.51 If we find in the De veritate claims which are not repeated
in, for instance, the Summa theologίae, it is probably because Aquinas
came to believe the earlier formulations were vague, or misleading,
or just plain wrong. But Duska does not cite later works. Secondly,
Duska says that Aquinas gives a "definition" of good in the passage he
quotes, though Aquinas does not speak of a definitio in this passage.
Duska, however, does not mention what Aquinas does call a definitio,
Aristotle's formula 'that to which all things are naturally inclined*.
Thirdly, though Duska does say that though this "characterization"
is not a proper definition in terms of genus and species, he calls it a
definition because "if any characterization gives necessary condition, it
seems to be some attempt to define."52 But in saying this he conflates
the essence of a thing and its proper accidents, which are not part of
the essence but which may also be necessary attributes of things with
that essence. Fourthly, Duska distinguishes (1) ends for beings which
50. The dual component view of the ratio of good seems to be the majority
position presently, Grisez and Finnis not withstanding. It is found not only in
Mclnerny and Duska, but in others as well. For example, Peter Simpson in a recent
article, "St. Thomas on the Naturalistic Fallacy," writes: "[Good] involves reference
to desire. . . . It expresses how that being, just as such a being, is a fulfillment and
completion of whatever is directed to it as to an object of desire. Good expresses being
along with the idea of end, goal or fulfillment" (p. 61). In interesting twists within this
confusing area, Douglas Flippen separates the two components into two distinct senses
of good, in "On Two Meanings of Good and the Foundation of Ethics in Aristotle
and Aquinas," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 58 (1984):
57-59. Janice Schultz, on the other hand, sees the desire component as involving
a relationship to a possible, rather than an actual, desire, in "Thomistic Metaethics
and a Present Controversy." I do not think that either Flippen's or Schultz's view
can be sustained, but I will not discuss them in this paper.
51. The De veritate consists of questions disputed during Aquinas's first Parisian
regency (1256-59), immediately after the completion of the commentary on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard and his inception in theology. Questions 21 and 22 were
probably disputed during the third year of that regency, 1258-59. For a discussion of
the dating, see James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D1Aquino: His Life, Thought, and
Work, rev. ed. (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), pp. 123-
125, with the summary on pp. 362-363.
52. Duska, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 152, n. 5.
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desire and enjoy, such as humans, and (2) ends which may be ends
simply in virtue of being the termination of a natural process, such as
becoming an oak is the end for an acorn. He then writes that "in the
passage cited [De veritate 21.2] the primary use of the word 'good' is
the use when [sic] it is applied to beings who desire and enjoy"^—
such as human beings. But Aquinas speaks of what is desired as
"appetitum," and he clearly holds that all creatures, living and non-
living, have "appetitus." Indeed, in the very sentence of De veritate
21.2 from which Duska takes the passage he quotes Aquinas illustrates
the "desire for" and "enjoyment of" an end with the example of a rock
which moves toward and ultimately rests at the center.
There are serious problems with Duska's essay, and anyone wishing
to defend Duska's view would have to address them. However, I will
assume that a more careful expositor of the dual component view can
handle them and will ask whether, these problems aside, the dual
component interpretation is defensible. I will argue that although
Aquinas sees that there is a close connection between being the object
of natural inclination and being good, the former cannot be part of
the ratio of the latter.
If the dual component view of the ratio of good is correct, then
being good is, at least partly, a relational attribute. The fact that X
is good is partially dependent on X's relation to other beings, viz.,
to beings with a natural inclination to X or the capacity to enjoy X.
If some thing, X, is good for humans, then it is part of the ratio of
good that there must be a human agent, A, who desires X or would
enjoy X if X were attained. The problem for the dual component
interpretation of Aquinas is that this does not seem to accord with
much of what Aquinas wrote.
Let us recall, first of all, the earlier discussion of scientific demon-
stration and its principles. There I argued that one may come to know
some principles of a science by inferring them from other propositions
not themselves principles. The fact that they are principles does not
mean they must be epistemically basic for a subject. Although this is
so, it is nevertheless clearly Aquinas's position that the principles de-
scribe what is the ultimate cause in a certain field. They are therefore
ultimate in the order of explanation in demonstrative science. If 'A
53. Duska, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 157.
THE GOOD AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 81
is B' is a principle of science, then there is no further middle term,
B*, with which we can demonstrate that B inheres in A. Rather, if
Ά is B*' is a claim within that field of science, B*'s inherence in
A is demonstrated with the principle Ά is B\ or with some other
principle, as a premise.
In the Summa theologiae the principles of practical reason include
propositions such as 'Knowledge is good* and 'Procreation and rearing
of children are good'. Consider a principle such as these. If the dual
component view is correct, then procreation is good only if it bears a
certain relationship to an agent with certain desires or dispositions to
enjoy, for part of what it is to be good is to be the object of desire and
enjoyment. Being good is, therefore, partially a relational attribute of
procreation. For any such relational attribute, its inherence can be
explained with reference to the relata and the relationship; that Bill
Clinton is the choice of the people, for example, can be explained
with reference to the people and their choice. Similarly, according
to the dual component view, it would seem that the goodness of
procreation and rearing can be explained with reference to the desires
and dispositions to enjoyment of human agents. Hence, the following
demonstrative syllogism seems possible:
Procreation is perfective and an object of desire.
What is perfective and an object of desire is good.
Procreation is good.
But if this is so, then the proposition 'Procreation is good' would
not be, as Thomas clearly claims it is, an immediate and per se nota
principle of practical reason. The same would be true for all the other
principles of practical reason.
There are also problems for the dual component interpretation
arising from the De veritate itself. In an article of De veritate q. 21,
Aquinas asks: "Are all things good by the First Goodness?" There
Aquinas tells us how a certain sort of Platonic account of good and
goodness can be sustained, for the First Goodness, God, is in a certain
way the principle of all good things. He writes:
If the First Goodness is the efficient cause of all goods, it must be that
he informs all his effects with his likeness; and so each thing is called
good through likeness to the highest good in the way of an inherent form
82 JOHN I. JENKINS
infused into it, and further through the First Goodness in the way of the
exemplar and efficient cause of all created goods.
Thus God, the first and highest good, is the principle of all goods
insofar as he infuses in all good things the form which is the likeness
of his goodness, and thus God is the exemplar and efficient cause of
their goodness. Here Aquinas only speaks of God being the principle
of good things insofar as he is the efficient cause and exemplar of
their intrinsic forms. However, if the dual component view is correct,
God could only be the principle of things being good if he were also
the principle of the inclinations of other creatures for the good thing.
Aquinas does not mention such inclinations in this article.
Furthermore, in De veritate 22.1 Thomas addresses the question:
"Utrum omnia bonum appetunt." It is perhaps obvious that he is not
asking whether there is some one thing which is good; the question
should not be translated: "Do all things desire the thing which is
good?" Rather, as he writes in response to an objection in this article,
"when one says 'all things are naturally inclined to good/ the good
need not be confined to this or that; it is, rather, to be taken in a
general sense, because each thing is naturally inclined to the good
naturally fitting to it."54 Thus, he is asking in this article whether
all things are naturally inclined to good. He asks, more precisely,
whether they are inclined to the good which is fitting to the sort of
creature they are; more simply, whether they are naturally inclined
to their good.
Thomas begins his respondeo by answering in the affirmative, both
for creatures having cognitive awareness, and for those lacking it.
After mentioning a contrary view of ancient philosophers and offering
an Aristotelian response, Aquinas goes on to explain how it is that
all things are naturally inclined to what is good. A thing may be
ordered to something in one of two kinds of ways: (1) a creature with
some cognitive awareness of its end may be ordered of itself to its
end, as a human being moves to the place she wishes to be; (2) a
creature may be directed to its end by another, and this may be so
even if it lacks cognitive awareness of its end, as an arrow which
is directed to its target by an archer. Among cases of kind (2), the
direction may come about (2a) violently, which occurs when the
54. Thomas Aquinas De vent. 22 A ad 4.
THE GOOD AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 83
creature has no form in virtue of which there is a natural inclination
to the end, as when a rock is thrown upwards. Alternatively, it may
come about (2b) naturally, which occurs when the one directing the
thing instills a form in virtue of which it is naturally inclined to
its end, as when a rock is given a natural inclination to downward
movement and moves downward. Non-cognitive, natural things have
instilled in them forms in virtue of which they are naturally inclined
to their proper ends. Although Aquinas does not emphasize it in
this article, this is also true for creatures with cognitive awareness of
ends, such as human beings, for they also have natural inclinations
to their proper ends instilled by God, who is the first mover.55 What
is naturally inclined to something is naturally inclined to that thing
because of what the one who guides or directs it by instilling a form
wills. So all natural things are naturally inclined to that to which God
wills them to be inclined. Thomas then concludes the main argument
of the article:
Since God has no other end of his will but himself, and since he is the
essence of goodness, it must be that all other things are naturally inclined
to good.56
The main argument of the article that all things are naturally
inclined to their good seems to be more or less the following:
(1) Whatever are the objects of natural inclination are what God
wills them to be.
(2) The end of God's will is God.
(3) God is the essence of goodness.
(4) The end of God's will is the essence of goodness, goodness
itself.
(5) God wills for each creature what is good for that creature.5?
55. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas De vent. 22 A ad 6.
56. Thomas Aquinas De verit. 22.1.
57. Only premise (5) is not explicitly in De vent. 22.1 or does not follow obviously
from what is explicitly stated there. Yet it seems that it must be an implicit premise,
for otherwise Aquinas could not move from the claim that God wills goodness itself
(premise [4]) to the claim that creatures are naturally inclined to their respective
goods (premise [6]). Moreover, it is Aquinas's express view elsewhere that in virtue
of God's willing his own goodness he wills creaturely goods (see Summa contra
Gentiles 3.8).
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(6) The objects of a creature's natural inclinations are what is good
for that creature.
(7) Therefore, all creatures are naturally inclined to their good.
If this summary is roughly right, then Aquinas infers that creatures
are naturally inclined to their good from the facts that (1) God
determines the objects of creaturely natural inclinations, and (2) God
wills that creatures are inclined to their good. Hence, on Aquinas's
view, all things are naturally inclined to their good because of the
benevolence of God who instills in a creature the natural inclination
to its good. The dual component interpretation, however, cannot
make sense of this claim. According to it the fact that something is
good for a creature is partially constituted by the creature's inclina-
tions, and so a thing's being good for a creature cannot be prior to that
creature existing with certain inclinations. On the dual component
view, Aquinas's claim in the De veritate 22.1 would be similar to the
one that God wills that I most favor my favorite color, and so instills
in me a disposition to favor my favorite color. But this is nonsense, of
course, because nothing is my favorite color until I exist with certain
dispositions to favor one color more than others, so God cannot instill
in me inclinations to favor a color in light of what my favorite color is.
Similarly, if the dual component interpretation is right, then it would
be nonsense for Aquinas to say that God instills in creatures of a
certain kind natural inclinations to something because God wills that
they are naturally inclined to their good, for what is good for that sort
of creature cannot be prior to such creatures having certain natural
inclinations. But this is precisely what Aquinas claims. Hence, the
dual component interpretation—or any interpretation which makes
creaturely natural inclinations constitutive of what it is to be good
for that creature—cannot be right.
Duska's dual component essentialist interpretation fails even with
regard to the De veritate, where Duska believes it is strongly supported;
it certainly cannot be sustained for Aquinas's later works in which
there is less support. Moreover, I contend, the considerations just
advanced show that no essentialist interpretation of Aquinas can
succeed; that is, no interpretation which understands being the object
of natural inclination as part of the essence or ratio of good can be
sustained. The question then arises: what is the relationship between
being good for a certain sort of creature and being the object of such
creatures' natural inclinations?
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It is clear that Aquinas sees a close connection between being good
and being the object of natural inclination, and in the next section
I will say more about this connection. For now let us note that in
his commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and particularly on
Aristotle's definition of good as "that to which all things are naturally
inclined," Aquinas says that being the mover of natural appetitus is
an effect of good, but a proper effect.58 That is, being the object of
natural inclination is a proper or per se accident of good, rather than
an attribute which inheres merely per accidens, which we can call a
mere accident.
My claim against Duska's dual component interpretation—and
against any essentialist interpretation—is that being the object of
natural inclination (i.e., appetitus), or being genuinely factually desir-
able for humans, is not part of the essence or ratio of being good, but
is a proper effect and accident of the good. One might be tempted to
say, then, that although being the object of actual natural inclination
is not part of the essence or ratio of good, it is a necessary attribute of
the good as such. Although Aquinas does sometimes seem to suggest
that proper accidents are necessary and some of his commentators
have suggested they are,59 this must be qualified, at least with respect
to potencies of the soul, as desires are. For Aquinas holds that the
potencies of the soul are proper accidents of a human being,60 and
among these is the power of sight and hearing.61 Yet he certainly
recognized that some people are blind and deaf, and are not actually
able to see and hear. He explains this by saying that although one
may have a potency, a first actuality, due to the soul, the exercise,
58. Thomas Aquinas Sententia libri Ethicorum 1.1 in the Leonine Opera omnia 47
(Rome: Editori San Tomasso, 1969), p. 5, lines 155-160.
59. Aquinas writes that "what belongs to a thing per se is in that thing of
necessity, always and inseparably," in the Summa contra Gentiles 2.55, ed. C. Pera
(Rome: Marietti, 1961), no. 1432. Further, he writes elsewhere, "necessity results
from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject"
(Summa theol. 1.86.3). These passages are quoted by Petrus Hoenen, who comments,
"the necessity of this relationship between [proper accidents] and their substrate is
an absolute necessity." See his Reality and Judgement According to St. Thomas Aquinas,
trans. H. F. Tiblier (Chicago: Regnery, 1952), p. 118.
60. "A potency of the soul flows from its essence, not through a transformation,
but as a certain natural result, and it is simultaneous with the soul" (Summa theol.
1.77.7 ad 1).
61. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.78.3.
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or second actuality, of this potency is impeded by some defect in the
matter. Hence, although a mere potency due to the form may be
necessary for all who possess that form, still this potency may not be
able to be exercised if there is a defect in the matter, and thus there
may be members of the kind who cannot exercise the potency. Thus,
although all creatures of a kind may have a mere potency to desire
or be inclined to their good, it is not necessarily the case that they
actually desire or are so inclined. It is therefore not necessary that all
creatures have an actual natural inclination to their good. It is only
necessary that they have a potency to an actual inclination in virtue
of their form.
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
The reader is probably aware of a serious problem for
the view put forward so far. I have claimed that being the object of
natural inclination is not part of the essence or ratio of good, but is
only a proper effect or accident of being good. Yet in Summa theohgiae
1-2.94.2 Thomas says that the ratio of good is 'quod omnia appetunt\
'that to which all things are naturally inclined'. In another place he
calls this formula a definition.62 It seems obvious enough that if this
formula expresses the ratio of good, and indeed if it is a definition of
'good', then being object of natural inclination is part of the ratio or
essence of good. Furthermore, I have argued that Aquinas's view was
that we infer what is good for us by considering that to which we are
inclined (i.e., that which we genuinely factually desire). But how can
we make sense of this if being the object of natural inclination is not
part of the ratio of good?
The first objection is, I believe, the strongest and I will take
much longer to respond to it. My response will consist largely of a
discussion of Aquinas's views on our ideas ("rationes") in general and
the definitions which express them. This area is obviously broad and
complex, and my treatment in this paper must be somewhat sketchy.
Yet I hope to present and argue for the outline of an interpretation
of Aquinas on these issues which will enable me to respond to this
62. Thomas Aquinas Sent. Ethic. 1.1 (Leonine 47:5.5.149).
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objection and which, I believe, will illumine Aquinas's general views
on rationes and definitions.63
First of all, let us recall that although the ideal sort of definition
after which Aquinas strives mentions only essential attributes, he
does recognize and use definitions which mention accidents of the
definiendum. For instance, in Summa theologiae 1.29.1 ad. 3 Thomas
tells us that, having perceived something as common as fire, we can be
ignorant of the substantial difference of its proper definition, and must
allow 'hot, dry body'—a definition which employs proper accidents—
to stand in as the definition of fire. Again, in Summa theologiae 1.77.1
ad.7 he writes:
Nevertheless because substantial forms, unknown to us of themselves, are
known through their accidents, there is no difficulty with sometimes using
accidents in place of substantial differences.64
How is it, though, that accidents can be used to define an essence
when the essential attributes are unknown? How can such a formula
serve as a definition of that essence at all? Some light can be shed
on these questions from Thomas's commentary on chapters 8-10 of
Book II of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Several writers have recently
claimed that these passages are important for understanding Aristotle's
views on definition,65 but little has been written on how Aquinas's
commentary on these chapters might illumine his views on definition.
According to Thomas, in chapter 8 of Book II Aristotle considers two
cases of an imperfect apprehension:
Aristotle says that we can know scientifically that some thing is, and yet
not know from this what the thing is; and this can happen in two ways.
In the first way, we know some accident of the thing, as, for example, if
63. See my "Aquinas on the Veracity of the Intellect" for a somewhat fuller
presentation of and argument for this interpretation.
64. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.77.1 ad 7.
65. Some of these are: Robert Bolton, "Essentialism and Semantic Theory in
Aristotle," Phibsophical Review 85 (1976): 514-544; J. A. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Theory
of Definition: Some Questions on An. Post. Π.8-10," Aristotle on Science: The Toste-
rior Analytics', ed. Enrico Berti (Padua: Antenore, 1981), pp. 359-384; and Richard
Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (London: Duck-
worth, 1980), pp. 195-201.
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we think that a hare exists on the basis of quick movement. In a second
way, we know something on the basis of its essence.66
The first sort of partial knowledge, of accidents only, is quite deficient:
(1) it is insufficient for any sort of scientific knowledge of the essence;
(2) it does not constitute scientific knowledge that the substance
exists; (3) it is not in potency to a full grasp of the essence. In the
second case, something of the essence is grasped. The second sort of
apprehension is much more adequate: (1) it does qualify as some sort
of grasp of the essence; (2) it does constitute scientific knowledge
that the substance exists; and (3) it is in potency to full scientific
knowledge of the essence. One instance of this is had, as Aquinas
writes, "if we grasp that man is on the basis of the fact that man is ra^
tional, while not yet knowing the other attributes which complete the
essence of man."67 Furthermore, this is the sort of case Thomas takes
Aristotle to be speaking of when he offers the following accounts:
(1) The definition of thunder ' is 'a certain noise in the clouds*.
(2) The definition of 'eclipse' is 'a certain privation of light'.
(3) The definition of 'man' is 'a certain animal'.
(4) The definition of 'souP is ' that which moves itself.
W h e n one has a grasp of some part of the essence, one grasps
the essence partially and is in potency to a full apprehension. It is
important for us to appreciate, however, what the imperfect idea is
not. It is not, for some essential attribute, the idea of whatever has
that attribute. In the case of thunder, for instance, the claim is not:
(5) The definition of 'thunder' is 'any noise in the clouds'.
This would not be an idea of thunder at all, for, as Thomas says,
"not every 'noise in the clouds' is thunder."68 If the cognitive grasp
in question is to be the idea of thunder, then it must be an idea
of the property being a noise in the clouds as part of a yet-to^be'
discovered essence. This would involve a presupposition that there
is some essence yet to be discovered, and some way in which that
essence is signified. The idea must be that expressed by:
66. Thomas Aquinas Expos. Post. 2.7 (Leonine 1*/2:199.126-131).
67. Thomas Aquinas Expos. Post. 2.7 (Leonine 1*/2:199.133-135).
68. Thomas Aquinas Expos. Post. 2.7 (Leonine 1*/2:199.146-147).
THE GOOD AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 89
(6) The definition of 'thunder' is 'a certain sort of noise in the
clouds' ("quaedam sonam in nubibus").69
I am taking the "certain sort of as a reference to the as-yet-not-
fully-known essence. The reference would seem to be in virtue of the
instances of the properties which are taken as part of the essence;
the phrase in question refers to their underlying cause. As he says
in an analogous case, when speaking of using accidentia propria in
place of unknown essential properties, the accidentia propria are used
in the definition as "effects of the substantial forms, and as making
these forms known ('manifestant eas')."70 They are used to identify
demonstrably the underlying essence which is to be discovered.
In the chapters of the Posterior Analytics under consideration, Aris-
totle and Aquinas discuss only essences the study of which falls to
what Aquinas calls natural philosophy or physics. Aquinas follows
what he believes is Aristotle's view, that when our grasp of a certain
natural essence is deficient, when some essential attributes are un-
known to us, we may employ a definition which mentions accidental
attributes. The yet-to-be-fully-grasped essence is identified demon-
strably as the underlying cause of the instances of the accidental
attribute(s) specified in the definition. Such a definition specifies
certain accidental attributes of the essence and refers to the essence,
which is not itself fully known, as the underlying cause. Henceforth
I will call such definitions 'reference-involving' definitions; I will say
that terms which are referentially defined in this way possess semantic
depth,71 for the essence signified (in Aquinas's sense of 'significare')
may be beyond what the language-users fully apprehend.
The reader will perhaps have realized that this view which I am
attributing to Aquinas is very close to so-called recent accounts of
natural kind terms which arose out of the work of Hilary Putnam and
Saul Kripke, and which has been developed by Colin McGinn and
Tyler Burge, among others. Several writers have found such a view
in Aristotle.72 Although I also think Aristotle did hold such a view,
the evidence that he did is somewhat ambiguous. Aquinas, I believe,
69. Thomas Aquinas Expos. Post. 2.7 (Leonine 1*/2:199.144).
70. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.29.1 ad 3.
71. I take this expression from David Charles, who uses it in an unpublished
manuscript on Aristotle's understanding of definition.
72. See note 65 above.
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embraced and put forward a more sophisticated and clearer version of
this sort of account. 7 3
Let us return to the ratio boni and its definition. I want to argue
that Aquinas's use of 'good' and its definition can be understood as
analogous to 'thunder' and its definition. I contend that 'good' is
a term with a certain sort of semantic depth, and that its definition,
'that to which all things are naturally inclined,' is reference-involving.
O n this reading, although being the object of natural inclination is
a non-essential attribute of being good, it is used in the definition of
the term to refer to that attribute of being good which is in fact what
is the object of natural inclination.
This reading is strongly recommended by previous results of this
paper. In section I I I argued that Aquinas held that being the object of
natural inclination is not essential to being good; however, as pointed
out above, Aquinas defines good in terms of natural inclination.
The reading under consideration allows us to reconcile these two
apparently incompatible claims of Aquinas. Yet there is also strong
support for this reading from what Aquinas actually says about the
formula expressing the ratio of good.
In Summa theologiae 1-2.94-2 Aquinas gives us the definition of
'bonum' as 'quod omnia appetunt', but he does not elaborate there
upon this definition. The definition is, of course, taken from the first
lines of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and in Aquinas's commentary
on the Ethics we do find a discussion of it. Aristotle begins with the
well-known lines:
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly
been declared to be that at which all things aim.74
73. One writer who thinks the Krίpke-Putnam account of natural kind terms
is relevant to Aquinas is Janice Schultz, who discusses it extensively in CΓNecessary
Moral Principles." However, Schultz does not discuss the Kripke-Putnam account
with respect to an incomplete grasp of an essence and reference-involving definitions.
Her concern is to show that per se predications of proper accidents may be necessarily
true, and yet informative. Schultz, however, would not be in agreement with my
account of the ratio of good and its definition, for she offers a different account in
her "Thomistic Metaethics and a Present Controversy."
74. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.1 1094al-3, trans. W. D. Ross, rev. J. O.
Urmson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Prince'
ton University Press, 1984) 2:1729.
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In the Latin translation, the second phrase of the quote (which
comes after the semicolon in the translation above) is: "Ideo bene
enunciaverunt, bonum quod omnia appetunt." 7 5 Thus in this phrase
Aristotle presents what Aquinas takes as the definition of 'good',
'that to which all things are naturally inclined'. Aquinas begins his
comment on this second phrase by saying, "[Aristotle] makes his claim
manifest through the definition of good."7 6 He notes, however, that
there is a certain peculiarity about this definitional formula, for "the
good is counted among the first things." 7 7 He goes on to explain:
The first things cannot be made known through what is prior, but is made
known through what is posterior, as causes [are made known] through
their proper effects. And since the good is properly the spring of appetitus,
the good is marked off [describitur] with respect to the movement of
appetitus, as the moving power is customarily made manifest with respect
to what is moved. Thus [Aristotle] says that philosophers have rightly
declared that the good is 'that to which all things are naturally inclined
[appetunt]\Ί8
Aquinas says clearly that the definition, 'that to which all things
are naturally inclined', employs what is posterior to and an effect of
goodness—viz., the ability to move appetίtus, or natural inclination—
to define what is simple and primary, goodness. Being able to move
natural inclination, which, in the case of humans, is being genuinely
factually desirable, cannot then be part of the essence or ratio of good.
If it were, being good could not be said to be simple and prior to being
able to move appetitus, for the latter would be (at least partially)
constitutive of the former. We must, therefore, take being able to
move appetitus (and being genuinely factually desirable) to be a non-
essential attribute of goodness, and to be used in the definition to refer
to the simple and primary essence of goodness. Thus, the definition
of 'good' is reference-involving and the term has semantic depth.
It seems, then, that the definition of 'good' as 'that to which all
things are naturally inclined', as Aquinas understands it, does not
undermine my contention that being the object of natural inclination
is not part of the essence or ratio of good. On the contrary, it supports
75. Aristotle, as Thomas reads him in Sent. Ethic.
76. Thomas Aquinas Sent. Ethic. 1.1 (Leonine 47:5.149).
77. Thomas Aquinas Sent. Ethic. 1.1 (Leonine 47:5.150-151).
78. Thomas Aquinas Sent. Ethic. 1.1 (Leonine 47:5.153-160).
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it. For when Aquinas discusses the definition he implies that it is a
reference-involving definition which employs an accidental attribute
to specify an essence.
There is, however, an important difference between good and its
definition and terms from what Aquinas calls natural philosophy, such
as thunder and eclipse, and their respective definitions. In the case
of thunder and eclipse, it may be argued, although our grasp of these
essences is initially imperfect and impartial, there is reason to believe
that through prolonged scientific investigation, we can come to a full
grasp of these essences. Indeed, Aquinas follows Aristotle's attempts
to arrive at a fuller understanding of thunder and eclipses.79 It does
not seem that we can come to a fuller grasp of the essence of goodness
in this way, at least given our cognitive state on this ear th .^ We can,
of course, sharpen our ability to make practical moral judgments, but
this will get us no nearer a full grasp of good and a definition of 'good'
which does not employ accidental attributes.
For terms in Aquinas's natural philosophy, there is an expectation
that through scientific inquiry reference-involving definitions may be
replaced by definitions which are not reference-involving. In the case
of 'good' there seem to be no such expectation, given our cognitive
state in this life. A n objection may be raised, then, that because the
definitions of 'thunder' and 'eclipse' are provisional in a way in which
that of 'good' is not, this in some way undermines my contention
that 'good' has semantic depth and a reference-involving definition,
and my claim that the attribute mentioned in the definition is a non-
essential attribute of goodness.
This objection is without great force. There is no reason to think
that referential definitions must be provisional until scientific progress
brings us to a more adequate formulation. Another term which
Aquinas seems clearly to recognize as having semantic depth is 'God'.
The term 'God' for Aquinas is not the proper name of an individual,
but a general term used "to signify the divine nature."81 As Thomas
says, the essence of God is beyond our intellectual grasp in this life,
79. See Aquinas's commentary on Posterior Analytics 1.13 for a discussion of
eclipses, and on 2.10 for a discussion of thunder.
SO. The blessed who enjoy the beatific vision have a fuller grasp of goodness, for
they see the essence of God, who is goodness. But they enjoy a cognitive state which
cannot be enjoyed by anyone in this life on earth. Summa theol. 1-2.5.3 and 5.
81. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.13.8.
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and any understanding we have of God is from his effects, from the
creatures he has created.82 Any definition of the term, then, must be
in terms of his effects in creation. Being creator of the world, however,
is an accidental attribute of God,83 and this accidental attribute is
used to define referentially the divine nature; so the term has semantic
depth and a referential definition. In the case of God, Aquinas clearly
thinks there is no chance that we may progress toward a full grasp
of the divine nature in this life through scientific investigation.8^ In
this respect, then, 'good' is more like 'God1 than like 'thunder', for
the referential definition which employs accidental attributes is not
provisional until scientific inquiry leads us to a more adequate grasp
of the essence. It is, rather, the best definition we can have, given
our cognitive state in this life.
I conclude, then, that the definition of good, 'that to which all
things are naturally inclined,' is a reference-involving definition which
employs an accidental attribute of goodness to specify the simple and
prior essence. This conclusion enables us to reconcile the results of
the previous section with Aquinas's definition of good. In light of
this conclusion, it seems we must make a distinction among rationes
which is not always clearly made by Aquinas. Given Aquinas's view
that we can use a reference-involving definition to specify an essence
which may not itself be fully understood, we must distinguish in such
cases between an essence and our imperfect intellectual grasp of it.
We must distinguish between the full intelligible structure of certain
things, which exist in rebus in some way, and our apprehension of it.
When our understanding of an essence is complete, then there is no
difference between them. When our understanding is incomplete, as
when we use reference-involving definitions, there is some difference
between them. Thomas adopts no consistent terminology to mark
this difference between the essence and our imperfect understanding,
but it will be helpful for us to do so. I will henceforth cease to use
'idea' to translate 'ratio', the full intelligibility of the thing, and will
use 'concept'.85 When I speak of the intelligibility insofar as it is
82. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.13.1.
83. Thomas Aquinas Summa contra Gentiles 1.81.
84- Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1-2.5.3 and 5.
85. This term should not be confused with Aquinas's "conceptus," for he used
this term to denote judgments.
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understood by us, I will use 'conception'. 8 6 As was said, when our
apprehension is perfect, the intelligible form in our understanding is
identical with that in the thing; in this case our conception is identical
with the concept. When our apprehension is imperfect, they differ.
A confusing feature of Aquinas's terminology is that he uses 'ratio'
to refer to both concepts and our conceptions. Our intellect forms
ideas by abstracting the intelligible from individuating, designated
matter ("materia signata"), but not from common matter ("materia
communis"), and this is the ratio expressed by the definition.8 7 If our
understanding of, say, a human being is perfect, the intelligible form
in our intellects is identical with the intelligible structure of the thing,
and we can speak of them both as ratio hominis. If the intelligible form
is not fully grasped, as in the case of our understanding of thunder,
we can speak of our definition of thunder and the intellectual form as
grasped by our intellects, but this is not identical with the intelligible
structure of the thing. So, similarly he can speak of something being
good by an intrinsic form which is a similitude of the First Good-
ness, and also as the ratio of good as including being the object of
natural inclination. This is understandable because he considers our
imperfect conceptions to be inchoate forms which are in potency to
be perfect conceptions, 8 8 which are identical with the concept. Both
the imperfect and perfect members of a species are called by the same
name. Yet the matter is confusing, and has, I believe, confused many
commentators on Aquinas.
My claim, then, is that although being the object of natural incli-
nation is accidental to the concept of good, it is nevertheless central
to our conception of good. This leads us to a response to the second
objection raised at the start of this section, namely: how are we to
86. The terms 'concept' and 'conception' are derived from Frege, but I certainly do
not want to suggest that Thomas accepted Fregean concepts. Nevertheless, it is meant
to suggest that Thomas's natures as such have a certain existence independent of our
understanding them. As Edwards argues (persuasively, to my mind), on a correct
understanding of his view "Aquinas turns out to be almost as strong a realist as
Duns Scotus." See Sandra Edwards, "The Realism of Aquinas," New Scholasticism 59
(1985): 79.
87. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.85.1; Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Tήnitate
5.2.
88. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. L85.3.
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account for the fact that Aquinas infers what is good for humans
from what their natural inclinations are, if these are accidental to
being good? Clearly, we make inferences about things insofar as we
understand the sorts of things they are. Hence, we make inferences
on the basis of our conceptions of their form, and not necessarily on
the basis of concepts. Since, in the case of good, the feature central to
our conception is being the object of natural inclination, inferences
about what is good for us are understandable based on that to which
we think we are naturally inclined, in the sense of genuinely factually
desiring. Of course, there may be a further question about why such an
inference is rational, or why it produces knowledge ("scientia")* but
this would require a lengthy treatment of Aquinas's epistemological
views, which I cannot take up here.89
CONCLUSION
A deep difficulty for moral philosophers is that in their
analysis of the nature of good they seem to be pulled in opposite di'
rections. That something is good for us must provide some motivation
for us to bring that thing about. Our good must be something that
interests and attracts us. Hence, it is thought, being the object of our
inclinations must be (at least) part of what it is to be good for us.
This view leads one in the direction of moral subjectivism and moral
relativism.
On the other hand, it seems that the fact that something is good or
evil cannot depend on whether we are attracted to it or repulsed by it.
As W. D. Ross wrote in his classic work The Right and the Good, "it is
surely a strange reversal of the natural order of thought to say that our
admiring an action either is, or is what necessitates, its being good.
We think of its goodness as what we admire in it, and as something
it would have even if no one admired it, something it has in itself."90
This view moves us toward moral objectivism.
89. For a fuller discussion of Aquinas's epistemological views, see my "Knowledge,
Faith and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas," doctoral dissertation, Oxford University,
1989, especially chapter 1, "The Natural Light of the Intellect."
90. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 1930), p. 89.
96 JOHN I. JENKINS
In this essay I have argued for an interpretation of Aquinas which
goes some way toward accommodating both of these apparently con*
flicting intuitions. Our conception, our understanding, of good is as
'that to which all things are naturally inclined'. This definition takes
an accidental attribute of goodness, being the object of creaturely
natural inclinations {appetitus), and marks off the good as that which
is the spring of such actual natural inclinations in the creatures on
this earth. In this way an accidental attribute is used in the definition
of 'good'. But although our own dispositions to desire are intimately
involved in our understanding of and reasoning about what is good
for us, nevertheless being good does not consist in being the object
of such desires: rather, being able to move us to desire is an effect of
and posterior to being good. As Aquinas writes, "bonum numeratur
inter prima."91
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91. Thomas Aquinas Sent. Ethic. 1.1.
